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Fifty-four banks failed in the first quarter of 1987, more than in any
quarter since 1933.' Because bank failures are linked to bank risk, most of
the regulatory proposals offered to control the growing number of bank
failures are designed to encourage depositors to exert market discipline on
bank officers and directors, thereby decreasing bank risk and lowering the
incidence of bank failure.' For policies relying on depositor discipline to
be effective, depositors' assets must be exposed to some risk, so that depos-
itors will have an incentive to check the soundness of the banks in which
they have deposited their money. At present, however, bank failure policy
uses federal bailouts and arranged mergers for most failing banks, provid-
ing essentially complete protection for all depositors, regardless of the size
of their deposits. This policy reduces the effectiveness of depositor disci-
pline. In addition, the policy removes the incentive for bank managers to
limit risk-taking, in effect subsidizing poorly managed, risky banks, and
increases the likelihood of bank failures.
Professor Helen A. Garten, in a recent and provocative article in this
Journal, points out the importance of determining whether "market disci-
pline by depositors will work in practice as it is supposed to work in
theory" before using the premise of depositor discipline as the basis of
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regulation to control bank risk-taking.3 She contends that no evidence sup-
ports the proposition that depositor discipline can be an effective tool in
controlling bank risk," and she states that the assumption that depositors
faced with some risk of loss in bank failures will cause banks to control
their risk-taking is flawed? This Article disputes Garten's theoretical ar-
guments. We find a good deal of support for the proposition that depositor
discipline can control risk-taking by bankers. Ultimately, as with so many
economic questions, this one is subject to resolution through empirical
testing. We also dispute Garten's contention that the proposition that
market discipline by depositors works lacks empirical support. In fact, we
find a considerable body of data to support that proposition. Thus, we
argue for a market-oriented approach to bank regulation.
Part I of this Article explains the nature of the problem of excessive
risk-taking by banks. Part II discusses the theoretical basis for the argu-
ment that depositors can exert market discipline. In Part III, the most
important section of this paper, we present the empirical evidence bearing
on the efficacy of market discipline. Finally, Part IV offers our prelimi-
nary proposals for regulatory changes that would use depositor discipline
to control bank risk.
I. Current Regulatory Distortions to Market Incentives
Applying the modern theory of corporate finance in the banking context
reveals an inherent conflict of interest between bank depositors and share-
holders.' In the absence of regulations that distort incentives, depositors,
who are fixed claimants to firms' income flows, prefer firms to maximize
the probability that the fixed claims will be repaid. By contrast, share-
holders, who are residual claimants, prefer the firms in which they invest
to pursue more risky investment strategies that maximize their ultimate
returns.' Depositors and investors will prefer the firms in which they have
placed their money to pursue such conflicting strategies, even if the total
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7. For an elegant and cogent illustration of the conflict between fixed and residual claimants, see
W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LFGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCI-
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values of the firms' investments are the same under the alternative invest-
ment strategies.
The administration of federal insurance for bank and thrift depositors
through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) presents an inter-
esting twist on the nature of the conflict between fixed and residual claim-
ants in financial institutions. The federal insurance system removes the
incentive that the fixed claimants otherwise have to reduce the risk-taking
proclivities of the residual claimants. The debate about depositor disci-
pline has not focused on the deposits of less than $100,000 which statutes
require the FDIC and the FSLIC to insure.8 Instead, the focus has been
on liquidation strategies used by the federal agencies that provide protec-
tion not only for the relatively small depositors, but for all depositors.
These strategies have transformed a system that was not designed to avert
all the risk inherent in the business of banking into a system that essen-
tially guarantees full protection for every depositor, regardless of the size
of the deposit.
Federal regulators have three options when faced with an insolvent in-
sured depository institution. Recently, the traditional alternative, a deposit
payoff, has rarely been used. In a deposit payoff, the regulator liquidates
the bank and makes immediate payments to insured depositors only up to
the $100,000 limit. Depositors with accounts above the insured limit be-
come general creditors of the bank for the uninsured amount. They share
any proceeds from the sale of the bank assets with other general creditors
(including the FDIC in its corporate capacity as insurer) on a pro rata
basis after the secured creditors have been paid.9
The second alternative available to regulators is a purchase and as-
sumption transaction, a method through which other banks bid for the
assets of the failed institution that are considered to be of good value. 0
The winning bidder acquires these assets and assumes the deposit liabili-
ties of the failed bank. The FDIC can provide additional cash and make
other, more customized arrangements where the value of the assets of the
failed bank is lower (or harder to evaluate) than the deposit liabilities
8. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724(b), 1813(m) (1983).
9. See 12 U.S.C. § 194 (1983)
10. See Gilbert, Recent Changes in Handling Bank Failures and Their Effects on the Banking
Industry, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. Louis REV., June/July 1985, at 21; Norcross, The Bank
Insolvency Game: FDIC Superpowers, the D'Oench Doctrine, and Federal Common Law, 103
BANKING L.J. 316, 348 n.137 (1986). Acceptable assets ordinarily include the failed bank's cash, its
securities portfolio, and the bank building. For a general discussion of the mechanics of a purchase
and assumption transaction, see Burgee, Purchase and Assumption Transactions under the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, 14 FORUM 1146 (1979).
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assumed.1" For our purposes, the importance of the purchase and assump-
tion transaction lies in the fact that all of the failed bank's deposit
liabilities-including deposit liabilities above $100,000-are assumed by
the successful bidder.
The final technique for handling the failure of an insured depository
institution, known as open-bank assistance, vaulted into the public con-
sciousness when it was used to bail out the Continental Illinois National
Bank and Trust Company in 1984 ." Under this scheme, the federal in-
surer provides assurances and financial support that "all depositors and
other general creditors of the bank will be fully protected and services to
the bank's customers will not be interrupted.""3 Under a plan of open-
bank assistance, the federal agency removes troubled loans from the bank
and provides a capital infusion through the purchase of preferred stock or
debentures."'
Both open-bank assistance plans and purchase and assumption transac-
tions insulate all depositors and most creditors from any risk of loss and
therefore remove any incentive that even the large depositors might have
to control excessive risk-taking by bankers. To see why this is so, imagine
the decision-making process faced by management in a bank with deposi-
tors who are insured either directly by the FDIC or defacto as a result of
the regulatory policy concerning failed banks. For such a bank, a manage-
rial decision to shift the bank's loan portfolio from a set of relatively safe
assets to a set of highly risky assets will not affect in any way the interest
the bank must pay to attract deposits. 5 On the other hand, in a world of
uninsured deposits, as Fischel, Rosenfield, and Stillman have pointed out,
"the bank . . . must consider the probability that adding the loan to its
portfolio of assets will force it to pay more to attract and preserve
deposits." '16
The implications of this analysis are clear. In a world of insured depos-
its, at the margin, the bank . . . has an incentive to make risky loans that
it would not make but for insurance. . . . Therefore, when the price of
11. Gilbert, supra note 10, at 22.
12. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, FDIC, and Federal Reserve Board, A Perma-
nent Assistance Program for Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company, ISSUES IN
BANK REG., Spring 1984, at 6.
13. Joint News Release of FDIC, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Reserve
Board, May 17, 1984, reprinted in Gilbert, supra note 10, at 24 (describing Continental Illinois
bailout).
14. See Gilbert, supra note 10, at 22. The most recent guidelines that outline the conditions under
which the FDIC will grant open-bank assistance were promulgated in December 1986. See Statement
of Policy and Criteria on Assistance to Operating Insured Banks, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,122-23 (FDIC
1986).
15. Fischel, Stillman & Rosenfield, supra note 6, at 314 ("the funding costs of the bank in the
world of insured deposits and fixed insurance premiums are unaffected by the risky loan").
16. Id.
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insurance is fixed, increasing the riskiness of the loan portfolio ...re-
dounds primarily to the benefit of the residual claimants-bank
stockholders."'
A fixed-price deposit insurance scheme (such as the one currently in
place) benefits bank shareholders rather than depositors, as is generally
thought, because a firm's stockholders, as residual claimants to the firm's
earnings, prefer the firm to pursue risky projects, whereas fixed claimants,
such as depositors, do not.
Creditors do not want the firm in which they have invested their money
to pursue risky projects because, as fixed claimants, they receive none of
the benefits from the extra returns associated with such projects, yet they
stand to lose if the projects do not fare well. By contrast, the stockholders,
as residual claimants, share the costs with the fixed claimants on the
down-side but capture all of the gains after the obligations to fixed claim-
ants have been paid. 8 Fixed-price deposit insurance thus benefits share-
holders rather than depositors by enabling stockholders to engage in high
risk projects without being charged a risk premium for such projects by
the uninsured depositors.
By contrast, in a world in which fixed claimants such as depositors face
risk of loss, "as long as [fixed claimants] accurately perceive the motiva-
tion of the equity-owning manager"' 9 to engage in high-risk projects,
shareholders, not depositors, lose if firms engage in excessive risk-taking.
The fixed claimants will raise the rates charged to extend money in a
situation where managers have the opportunity to shift the firm's invest-
ment strategy from low-risk to high-risk projects. This increased rate will
reflect the greater risks associated with such a firm.2"
Thus, shareholders of banks with depositors who are not insured by the
FDIC will not merely bear the costs of actual increases in the riskiness of
their banks; they also will bear the costs of any inability to assure deposi-
tors credibly that they will refrain from shifting from low-risk investment
strategies to high-risk investment strategies in the future. This arrange-
ment provides shareholders with strong incentives to issue contractual
17. Id.
18. Rational creditors will not increase firms' debt beyond a certain point, because such a capital
structure gives a residual claimant a "strong incentive to engage in activities (investments) which
promise very high payoffs if successful even if they have a very low probability of success. If they turn
out well, he captures most of the gains; if they turn out badly, the creditors bear most of the costs."
Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Struc-
ture, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334-37 (1976).
19. Id. at 337.
20. Id. at 338.
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promises to depositors limiting the riskiness of the bank's future
activities.2
To summarize, depositors will be indifferent between putting their
money in insured, riskless banks at riskless rates of return and putting
their money in uninsured, risky banks at higher, risk-adjusted rates of
return, particularly given opportunities for diversification that cause ra-
tional investors to behave in a risk-neutral fashion. The current regulatory
scheme, which provides a large measure of protection for uninsured de-
positors, encourages risky behavior by banks and is in essence a wealth
transfer used to subsidize risky banks.
The bank settlement techniques preferred by the FDIC also create a
phenomenon known to economists as a "moral hazard" problem. Such a
problem exists in all insurance contracts because those who would receive
payment from the insurance company have a lower incentive to engage in
risk-reduction strategies.2 But in federally administered insurance pro-
grams, the standard mechanisms through which excessive risk-taking is
controlled by private insurers, such as deductibles, co-insurance, and risk-
related premiums, are nonexistent. 3 In turn, the absence of these contrac-
tual devices makes internalization of the costs of risky activities more diffi-
cult for banking regulators than for private insurers. 4 For the banking
industry, these contractual devices to control excessive risk-taking are re-
placed by monitoring by state and federal regulators and by other regula-
tory devices such as lending limits, minimum capital requirements, restric-
tions on insider dealings, and restrictions on competition among firms.
The likelihood that regulators are as effective as private parties at de-
signing methods to control bank risk is slight, because unlike private par-
ties, regulators do not have their own funds at stake in the contracting
process. Given this situation, regulators have a lower incentive to impose
effective restrictions on risk-taking-they have very little to lose if their
strategies fail. Regulators have little, if any, personal stake in bank regu-
lation for two reasons. First, bank management, not regulators, bear the
primary responsibility for a bank failure. Regulators do not manage the
day-to-day activities of the banks they regulate; those who do bear the
21. Shareholders of publicly held lirms commonly make promises to fixed claimants to employ
outside auditors; to produce detailed, independently prepared financial statements; to maintain certain
levels of working capital; or to refrain from paying dividends or issuing additional debt. This list is
just a small sampling of the array of contractual mechanisms used by shareholders and fixed claim-
ants. For a detailed inventory accompanied by a useful economic analysis, see Smith & Warner, On
Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979).
22. For a discussion of the moral hazard problem in private insurance schemes and methods to
decrease its effect, see K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANC(E, LE(;Ai. THEORY, AND PUB-
LIC: POt.I(Y 14-16 (1986).
23. See Fischel, Rosenfield, & Stillman, supra note 6, at 314.
24. Id. at 315.
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primary responsibility for failure. Second, and more important, regulators
have a variety of constituencies, some of whom have only a slight degree
of interest in ensuring bank safety.
Two of the most important constituencies of bank regulators are the
banks that they regulate and the congressional committees that provide
oversight and influence the levels of funding received by the regulatory
agencies. Clearly, the banks themselves are not eager to have significant
impediments imposed on their activities. To the extent that bank regula-
tory policy is influenced by the regulated entities,2 5 this policy will not
force banks to internalize the full costs of the risks associated with their
activities. In fact, over a wide range of regulatory issues, this constituency
may be as likely to lead bank regulators away from solutions to the bank
failure problem as towards solutions.
Nor is Congress likely to demand that banking regulators pay close
attention to matters of bank safety; after all, their money is not at stake,
either. Rather, the politicians with oversight responsibilities for regulatory
agencies are more likely to promote solutions to bank failure problems
that favor the powerful interest groups that form the politicians' own po-
litical bases.26 Once again, the banks themselves are likely to have a dis-
proportionate influence on the politicians. 7 A point made in a recent arti-
cle by Professor Fred McChesney is particularly relevant here: he
observes that powerful special interest groups are willing to spend politi-
cal capital to pressure politicians and regulators to forbear from regulat-
ing.28 McChesney's analysis applies with great force to the world of bank-
ing. As is well known, Jim Wright, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, recently has invested considerable time and energy to
pressure regulatory agencies to forbear from closing insolvent savings and
loan associations in his home state of Texas. 9 Wright seems to be moti-
25. The classic expression of the argument that producers strongly influence the actions of regula-
tors and lawmakers is Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGM'r. SCIL
3 (1971).
26. For a detailed explanation of why interest groups are more likely to obtain laws that further
their interests than are ordinary citizens, see J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSEN'T 283-96 (1962); M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 36-74 (1982); see also
Migu, Controls versus Subsidies in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 20 J. L. & ECON. 213, 214
("Regulation is ... an instrument of wealth transfer-the extent of which is determined in a politi-
cal market-where interest groups demand regulation and politician-regulators supply it.").
27. See M. OLSON, supra note 26.
28. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16
J. LEGAL. STUD. 101 (1987).
29. Banking regulators said that Wright intervened in a Federal Home Loan Bank Board probe
of Thomas M. Gaubert, a major Democratic fund-raiser and owner of the Independent American
Savings Association in Irving, Texas. To defend Wright's actions, a spokesperson for the Congress-
man claimed that Wright consistently aided Texas depository institutions from what he considers to
be overly strenuous enforcement efforts. See N.Y. Times, June 22, 1987, § I, at 12, col. 5; see also
N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1987, § IV, at 2, col. 1 (describing Wright's efforts to obtain new rules making it
more dillicult for regulators to close troubled savings and loan institutions).
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vated by a desire to protect the management, employees, and debtors of
these institutions, rather than by a belief that a strategy of regulatory for-
bearance furthers the interests of the banking system or promotes the
cause of bank safety and soundness.
Thus, even conscientious regulators with the best intentions are likely
to produce regulations that provide a sub-optimal level of safety for the
banking system as a whole. The banking system is a disorganized, amor-
phous constituency that includes depositors and non-depositors, as well as
the banks themselves. Important members of this group have far less ac-
cess to and influence over bank regulators than bank managers and share-
holders groups." For this reason, a successful regulator inevitably will
find himself responding to more direct constituency pressures from the
latter groups.
It seems incontrovertible that the absence of any meaningful incentive
to control excessive risk-taking explains a significant portion of the bank
failures that have occurred to date.31 If even large depositors prove to be
unreliable agents for controlling risk-taking, then the social costs of pro-
tecting uninsured depositors through the use of open-bank assistance or
purchase and assumption transactions are likely to be negligible. By con-
trast, of course, if uninsured depositors exert significant pressure on bank
management to control excessive risk-taking, then the social costs of using
bank settlement techniques that negate the incentives of such depositors to
control risk-taking are likely to be significant.
We wish to emphasize that our analysis does not imply that regulators
completely lack the incentive to prevent banks from engaging in excessive
levels of risk-taking. Indeed, we observe regulatory measures such as re-
serve requirements, lending limits, and capital-to-asset ratio limitations,
all of which are designed to promote bank safety. Our point is not that
such regulatory devices do not exist; rather our arguments are (1) that
these measures impose fewer constraints on excessive risk-taking than
would be optimal from a societal perspective; and (2) that they do not
punish excessive risk-taking by individual banks in the same way as a
30. Even in the absence of the ordinary collective action problems that plague disorganized politi-
cal groups such as depositors, the existence of a federal deposit insurance program eliminates any
incentive depositors have to lobby for increased bank safety.
31. This discussion is not meant to suggest that federal insurance of bank deposits is a bad idea.
Rather, it is meant only to point out that the problem of excessive risk-taking by banks is a cost
associated with such insurance that ought not be ignored. Deposit insurance provides a host of bene-
lits, which may or may not outweigh the costs. Among the benefits are (1) the prevention of the
prisoner's dilemma among depositors that may lead to bank runs; (2) protection of relatively unso-
phisticated depositors against losing their funds in a bank failure that they lack the sophistication to
prevent; and (3) protection for, and a subsidy to, the nation's financial intermediaries. See Benston,
Brokered Deposits and Deposit Insurance Reform, IssuFs IN BANK Rt:c;. 17, 18 (Winter 1987).
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market-driven system would, because these measures are uniformly ap-
plied to all banks.
Finally, there is often a presumption that to make the case for depositor
discipline, one must prove that such discipline is better than or even as
good as the safety and soundness regulations promulgated by the regula-
tors. This presumption is flawed. One is only required to prove that de-
positor discipline would be a valuable complement to whatever beneficial
regulations are generated by the relevant agencies, and that the benefits to
the banking system of invoking the forces of depositor discipline would
outweigh the costs associated with this strategy. As we show in the follow-
ing section, our complaint with the current regulatory scheme is that it
deprives depositors of any incentive to impose market discipline on the
excessive risk-taking proclivities of the nation's banks.
II. Market Discipline by Uninsured Depositors: A Theoretical Model
The market system could become an effective tool for controlling the
risk that banks were willing to assume if bank regulators would eliminate
the use of bank settlement techniques that completely insulate depositors
from any risk of loss. Absent the economically perverse settlement tech-
niques currently used, uninsured depositors have information that would
enable them to demand higher returns from risky banks and to provide
banks with a clear incentive to control risk and minimize their cost of
funds. Moreover, in a market system unencumbered by guarantees, depos-
itors would demand contractual limitations on bank risks. Meanwhile,
banks would require limitations on depositors' right to withdraw funds,
thus reducing the likelihood of bank runs and the concomitant liquidity
crisis.
Our argument that in the absence of deposit insurance, depositors will
influence the excessive risk-taking proclivities of banks does not depend on
an assumption that concerns about risk are the only, or even the primary,
considerations of depositors. This statement is a rather basic point, but it
is often misunderstood. Professor Garten, for example, declares that for
depositor discipline to "cause banks to control their excessive risktaking
• .. there must be a group of investors for whom risk is the primary
consideration in choosing an investment. '82 She then concludes that be-
cause "most bank depositors .. .are concerned with factors other than
risk when they select a bank," depositor discipline is not likely to be a
useful method of controlling excessive risk-taking by banks.33
32. Garten, supra note 3, at 131.
33. Id.
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Initially, we view the assertion that depositors who are not the benefi-
ciaries of FDIC insurance will be blas6 about risk as highly implausible.
Professor Garten identifies such factors as "the convenient location of
bank offices" and "personal relationships with bank officers" as more im-
portant to depositors than risk." ' In light of the fact that most demand
accounts at commercial banks serve as the depositors' primary sources of
liquidity, 5 risky banks will have to foster extremely close personal rela-
tionships with customers or be extremely convenient for such concerns to
eliminate depositor concerns about riskiness.
Moreover, even if we take as true Professor Garten's assertion that de-
positors are more concerned with factors other than risk, to conclude from
this that depositor discipline will be wholly ineffective is still untenable. 6
When selecting a bank, anticipated riskiness will be a cost facing the de-
positor that he will weigh against benefits such as convenience and friend-
liness. Thus, the riskiness of the bank, together with a number of other
factors such as the bank's convenience and the friendliness of its employ-
ees, will inform the depositor's investment decision.3 7
In this way, the customer's decision about which bank to choose resem-
bles the consumer's decision about whether to buy a particular product
(such as detergent) at a convenience store or at a discount store. The cus-
tomer who shops at the convenience store forgoes savings for convenience;
the customer who shops at the discount store gives up convenience to ob-
tain a better price. Merely because we observe people shopping at conve-
nience stores, however, does not mean that we can infer that customers are
indifferent to price. If a convenience store charged its customers $100.00
for a box of detergent, it is unlikely that customers would continue to shop
there. Indeed, customers would be likely to travel a great distance (i.e., to
incur a large measure of inconvenience) to obtain a market price for
detergent.
This example emphasizes the fact that consumer decisions, including
the decision about where to deposit one's money, are made at the margin.
34. Id. at 134.
35. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System considers demand deposits at commer-
cial banks to be the equivalent of cash for purposes of calculating "Ml," the figure that represents the
nation's basic reservoir of liquidity.
36. Professor Garten also argues that, for different reasons, another group of depositors, which
she characterizes as "involuntary depositors," will be unconcerned with bank riskiness. Garten, supra
note 3, at 134. We consider this argument, infra, text accompanying notes 53-56.
37. This consideration assumes that depositors have sufficient information at their disposal to per-
mit them to evaluate bank riskiness. On this point we agree with Professor Garten-depositors do
have such information at their disposal. See infra, text accompanying notes 41-51; Garten, supra note
3 at 145 ("[Tihe market for bank stocks is using publicly available information to make accurate
judgments about bank risk. Since investors in bank deposits rely on exactly the same information, they
should in theory be equally successful.").
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Consumers make trade-offs between factors like risk and convenience
every day. In a world where depositors face risk of loss on the funds they
deposit in commercial banks, as the riskiness of a bank increases, deposi-
tors will begin to withdraw their money. Because bankers will recognize
this relationship, they will keep the riskiness of their activities sufficiently
low to enable them to attract and retain depositor funds.
From an economic perspective, the matter can be simply put: all deposi-
tors will engage in monitoring up to the point at which an additional
dollar spent on monitoring activity is offset by a dollar in expected savings
from default. At lower levels of monitoring, engaging in additional moni-
toring will prove profitable; at higher levels of monitoring, the costs of
some of the monitoring will outweigh the expected gains. The point at
which marginal monitoring costs equal marginal savings to depositors
from monitoring determines the efficient level of depositor monitoring
activity.
We recognize that free-rider and other collective action problems make
monitoring and controlling bank risk costly for certain individual deposi-
tors.18 For such depositors, the costs of engaging in sufficient monitoring
to obtain a useful amount of information about a bank will be quite high
if depositors are unable to act collectively. This collective action problem
is mitigated, however, by the fact that in a world where depositors face
risk of loss, they will demand compensation for bearing this risk.3 9 The
cost of paying this additional compensation to depositors is borne by the
shareholders and management of the risky bank. Thus, in the absence of
government protection, the banks themselves have strong incentives to mit-
igate the collective action problems facing depositors, because the banks
that do this can reduce their cost of capital.4"
Another prerequisite to effective market discipline is a means to control
information costs. To monitor and control bank risk effectively, depositors
must have sufficient information about the financial condition of the banks
in which they place deposits to make informed decisions about bank risk.
Depositors must also be able to use this information in a positive way, i.e.,
to influence bank management to decrease levels of risk-taking.
38. Our analysis of behavior at the margin explains why monitoring may be relatively unaffected
by free-rider problems. Because depositors have differing amounts of money invested in banks, vary-
ing risk preferences, and differing bank investment portfolios, the efficient level of monitoring will be
different for each depositor. Thus, a depositor cannot free-ride on another's monitoring, given that the
extent of monitoring by the second depositor may not adequately meet the first's needs. In other
words, as long as the gains from a given level of monitoring vary among depositors, none will be able
to free-ride completely on the monitoring efforts of others.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 15-24; see also Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, supra note
6, at 314.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 65-66.
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A. Information Available to Depositors
Banks whose securities are publicly traded must produce extensive in-
formation to allow investors to assess the risk associated with these securi-
ties,"' and this information is of equal value to depositors wishing to as-
sess bank risk. 42 In addition, all federally regulated banks must prepare
and submit annual statements of financial condition and income.4 Bank
regulators require additional disclosure "concerning areas of particular
supervisory concern," such as the provisions for disclosure of bank loans
to insiders."4
Even in the absence of federally mandated disclosure requirements,
banks in search of funds have strong incentives to provide a broad range
of relevant information voluntarily. 5 This notion is an extension of Pro-
fessor George Akerloff's important article about the market for "lemons"
(items of uncertain quality). 6 For uninsured depositors, bank safety is
analogous to product quality: safe banks offer a product of higher quality
than risky banks. Depositors who desire safety and who keep their money
at safe banks will have to pay for it by foregoing higher interest. Con-
versely, depositors who prefer a high return will prefer to place deposits
in riskier banks and receive compensation in the form of higher interest
for bearing that additional risk.
Suppose, however, that consumers are unable to distinguish risky banks
from safe banks. If this is the case, risk-neutral depositors will presume
they are receiving only the average level of safety. Those banks that are
safer than the average will be undercompensated for the level of service
they provide. They must choose either to withdraw their services from the
market or to discover a means to differentiate their superior (safer) prod-
uct from the inferior (riskier) products of their competitors.
Disclosure of information about financial condition, in conjunction with
stiff penalties for fraudulent disclosures, provides a means of sorting out
41. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. I 1984),
requires that public companies, including banks and bank holding companies, issue quarterly and
annual reports, as well as annual proxy statements. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78n(a) (1982).
42. See Garten, supra note 3, at 141.
43. See 12 U.S.C. § 161 (1982) (detailing financial reporting requirements for national banks); 12
U.S.C. § 324 (1982) (detailing reporting requirements for state-chartered banks that are members of
Federal Reserve System). See also Garten, supra note 3, at 141 n.71.
44. See 12 C.F.R. § 304.4 (1987); Garten, supra note 3, at 141 n.72.
45. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 1ST
SEss., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITIEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE "ro THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 637-39 (Comm. Print 1977) ; Benston, Required Periodic Disclosure
Under the Securities Acts and the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1471,
1473-76 (1979); Macey & Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process (forthcoming in 65
WASH. U.L.Q.).
46. Akerlofr, The Market for "Lemons:" Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84
Q.J. EcoN. 488 (1970).
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high quality products from low quality products. Where disclosure is pos-
sible, consumers will presume that firms that decline to disclose the details
of their financial condition are in the worst imaginable straits.47 Thus
virtually all banks, even in the absence of mandatory disclosure laws, have
a strong incentive to disclose relevant financial information and to do so in
a format that is credible, accessible, and intelligible to depositors. For this
reason, banks are willing to provide details about their condition to rating
agencies and other private sector financial analysts even without laws re-
quiring such disclosure.4
Finally, as Professor Garten has observed,49 prices are set at the mar-
gin, so it is not necessary that all depositors obtain information about their
banks' financial condition for disclosure to have an effect."0 So long as all
depositors can easily observe the interest rates available to large, sophisti-
cated depositors, they will not only have a good proxy for bank riskiness,
but they will also be able to demand a level of interest that permits them
to receive compensation for any risks they incur at a particular bank.5
B. The Usefulness of Available Information
From a policy perspective, information about a bank's financial condi-
tion will be useless to depositors unless the information is accurate, firm-
specific, and available to investors in time for it to matter. Uninsured de-
positors will demand information about a bank's financial condition when
they decide where to place their funds. At that moment, they will evaluate
the riskiness of the banks in the relevant market and make the appropri-
ate risk-return tradeoff. They have further incentives to continue to moni-
tor the chosen bank to discern changes in its financial condition during the
time their funds are deposited in the bank.52
Professor Garten suggests that a sizable group of depositors, the "invol-
untary" depositors, are unconcerned with the risk exposure of the finan-
cial institution that holds their deposits. Instead, the involuntary depositor
47. Benston, supra note 45, at 1476.
48. See Cates, Disciplined Bank Management Can Turn Risk to Its Advantage, Am. Banker,
Nov. 20, 1984, at 4, col I.
49. Garten, supra note 3, at 142-43.
50. Id. at 145.
51. Cf id. at 143-44. For empirical support of this proposition see infra text accompanying notes
78-81.
52. As with the first condition of accuracy, the fact that investors can obtain information about
bank financial condition in a timely fashion is also empirically supported. Indeed, the evidence shows
that private investors more quickly identify problem banks than do federal regulators. See Schick &
Sherman, Bank Stock Prices as an Early Warning System for Changes in Condition, I I J. BANK
RFs. 136 (1980); see also Garten, supra note 3, at 144-45 (summarizing other studies and concluding
that they suggest that the market "may already have been aware of the problem that led to the banks'
inclusion on the lists").
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chooses a bank primarily because of factors other than risk, such as conve-
nience, the quality of other banking services, and the high costs of chang-
ing banks.53 Garten's example of involuntary depositors occurs in a pay-
roll situation; she considers both the employer who deposits the firm's
payroll and the employee whose checking account is automatically
credited for wages as involuntary depositors.5" Given the dominance of
this class of depositor in the commercial banking system over the group of
investor-depositors who are primarily concerned with the riskiness of
banks, Garten argues that any attempt to use uninsured depositors as a
source of market discipline may be unsuccessful.
55
The idea of an involuntary depositor who is impervious to risk does not
withstand close scrutiny, however, because all uninsured depositors, invol-
untary depositors and investor-depositors alike, will be concerned with
bank risk. In the payroll situation, the employee's deposits are likely to be
less than $100,000 and to enjoy the statutory protection of federal deposit
insurance. Thus, the key depositor in terms of market discipline is the
employer who manages the payroll account and selects the bank for all the
accounts. Contrary to Garten's assertion, this involuntary depositor is a
potential source of strong market discipline.
The employer will desire to keep the main payroll account in a safe
bank because the account will often have a balance in excess of the in-
sured limit. If the bank engages in excessively risky activities and fails, the
employer will not only risk the loss of much of its savings but will also
continue to owe wages and salaries not transferred to the employee ac-
counts.5 6 Moreover, an employer will prefer to avoid the disruption and
loss of morale invariably associated with the failure to pay employees.
Thus, uninsured involuntary depositors, as well as investor-depositors, re-
present a means to control the risk exposure of depository institutions.
C. Depositors' Use of Information About Bank Riskiness
Given the availability of usable information, the most important issue is
whether uninsured depositors will use that information in a way consis-
tent with the public policy objective of a safe and stable banking system.
Critics of depositor discipline do not suggest that such discipline is nonex-
istent; instead, they object to the way depositors exercise this discipline.
Market discipline by depositors manifests itself in two ways: depositors
53. Garten, supra note 3, at 134.
54. Id. at 134-35.
55. Id. at 137.
56. See Closely Watched Banks: One that Got Away, Bus. WK., Oct. 19, 1987, at 108 (firms lost
payroll accounts over $100,000 in bank failure). The possibility of such losses suggests an important
reason for employers to prefer safe banks and to avoid risky institutions.
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may demand compensation ex ante, and they may withdraw funds already
deposited from banks that offer an unattractive mix of risk and return.
Those who doubt the efficacy of depositor discipline ignore the demand
for compensation before depositing and focus on the threat of withdrawal.
Professor Garten, for example, maintains that "in the market for depos-
its, sudden and devastating bank runs are the only form of discipline that
is likely to occur."57 She concludes that depositor discipline does not ap-
pear in a usable form, because in the end it only results in "discouraging
both bank depositors and management from expending any energy in the
ongoing monitoring of risk."58 This conclusion suggests that bank share-
holders and management are insensitive to the cost of funds and that de-
positors are somehow unable to obtain from banks contractual promises
that effectively constrain risk-taking.
Banks are sensitive to the costs of funds; other things being equal, bank
shareholders will prefer to keep the cost of capital low to obtain higher
returns on their equity investment. The fact that uninsured depositors will
demand risk premiums from banks that engage in risky activities provides
shareholders with an incentive to select management teams and boards of
directors that will control risk-taking. Put another way, market discipline
by depositors should be reflected in the portfolio allocation decisions of
bank management.
It has been suggested that banks may misperceive the signal that is sent
to them by an increase in funding costs. Specifically, Professor Garten
argues that "[nrate variations may also reflect the frequency with which
the bank sells deposits, returns on competitive investments, and market
conditions."'5' This argument ignores the fact that for the purposes of this
discussion, what matters to shareholders and managers of banks is not the
absolute cost of funds. Rather, banks are concerned with the costs of funds
relative to that of rival banks, and the spread between the cost of funds
and return in the form of interest paid by borrowers. Banks that make
riskier loans must earn a greater rate of return on assets to justify their
higher cost of funds due to a greater risk exposure.
Numerous contractual devices are available to prospective depositors
who wish to control excessive risk-taking before making their deposits."0
While these contractual devices are not costless, nothing suggests that de-
positors, like other creditors, will not employ them in a cost-effective man-
57. Garten, supra note 3, at 132.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 158 n.151.
60. For a general description of the various contractual devices that fixed claimants employ to
limit excessive risk-taking by residual claimants, see Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting: An
Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. EcoN. 117 (1979).
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ner. Moreover, such contractual devices would restrict firms' risk-taking,
belying Professor Garten's notion that bank runs are the only means for
depositors to express their disapproval of bank management.61 For exam-
ple, under the current system, depositors have no incentive to require the
banks in which their funds are held to maintain an equity cushion against
unforeseen fluctuations in the value of the bank's portfolio of assets. Nor
are banks encouraged to maintain high levels of loan loss reserves or even
to match the maturity schedules of their assets with their liabilities be-
cause depositors look to the assets of the federal government rather than
the assets of the bank to protect them from risk of loss.
Professor Garten argues that depositors will discipline banks primarily
through disastrous bank runs because withdrawal of deposits from a ques-
tionable bank is costless and easy for depositors.62 This argument has sev-
eral implications for Garten's position. First, the ease of withdrawal dis-
courages depositors from verifying negative rumors and may encourage
depositors to withdraw their money at the first unsubstantiated hint of
trouble. Second, depositors are apt to be indifferent to excessive risk tak-
ing because they can "easily escape [from the burning building] before the
roof collapses."
'6 3
The argument that depositors discipline banks only through fatally de-
structive runs is flawed because it assumes that a depositor who wants to
withdraw funds from a bank faces zero costs. This assumption ignores the
fact that depositors who withdraw their funds must put them somewhere
else. While the costs of physically removing the funds from one bank are
close to zero, the search for a safer depository institution is costly. The
cost of investigating the bank in which a depositor's money is held to ver-
ify rumors about changes in the bank's financial condition often will be
lower than the cost of locating another bank for the money,64 because the
depositor already has invested resources to develop a store of information
about the implicated bank at the time the withdrawal decision is being
made. To discover a new bank, the investigation must start from scratch
and encompass several financial institutions.
This is simply a specific application of the more general point made
previously that exerting market discipline on risky banks is costly to de-
positors, and that such decisions are made at the margin.65 The costs of
withdrawing money and searching for a new bank must be balanced
against the costs of keeping money in the old bank and pressuring bankers
61. See infra text accompanying notes 106-08.
62. Garten, supra note 3, at 153-154.
63. Id. at 153.
64. But see id. at 155-56.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 49-51.
Vol. 5: 215, 1988
Depositor Discipline
to change their policies. For large depositors, such jawboning may be an
attractive alternative to sudden withdrawal, particularly where banks that
have increased their levels of riskiness ex post are willing to pay for the
privilege of retaining the deposits by offering risk premiums.66
The second reason why depositor discipline is not likely to manifest
itself in the form of irrational and fatally destructive runs is that banks
could avoid the problem altogether. Banks could place limitations on de-
positors' rights to withdraw funds on demand, such as the current notice
requirements contained in many NOW account deposit agreements. If the
additional costs to banks in the form of higher interest payments on depos-
its (which banks inevitably will have to pay if customers cannot withdraw
their funds on demand) are lower than the benefits to banks in the form of
lower capital costs, banks will find offering such accounts to be in their
interest, even if they are not compelled to do so by regulators.17 Such a
reaction by banks would eliminate any collective action problem facing
bank depositors that might lead to destructive runs 8 and would provide
even greater incentives for depositors to demand ex ante contractual re-
straints on risk-taking by management.
In the real world, of course, monitoring by investors, including deposi-
tors, is costly because of such collective action problems as free-riding and
high information and enforcement costs. Thus, if an individual depositor
monitors bank management, he bears the full costs of this activity but
66. This analysis applies even where large depositors have funds on deposit at several banks. It
might appear that this sort of depositor simply will transfer money from his account at one bank to
his account at another bank if the first bank appears to be engaging in risky activities. Because deposi-
tor decisions are made at the margin, however, the decision to place additional funds in another
account will cause the depositor to engage in additional search about the second bank. The decision
for such a depositor will be whether the marginal costs of acquiring, processing, and verifying infor-
mation about the first bank are higher than the marginal costs of acquiring, processing, and verifying
information about the second bank.
67. A bank's cost of capital might be higher if it did not place limitations on depositors' rights to
withdraw their money on demand, because large uninsured depositors and other creditors might fear a
bank run if the bank did not impose such limitations and therefore might demand large risk premiums
on their deposits. In addition, rational, self-interested depositors might agree to forego immediate
access to their funds because such depositors realize that although such restrictions inconvenience
them, they also constrain other depositors and thus eliminate the possibility of a destructive bank run
that harms all depositors.
68. See Fischel, Rosenfield, & Stillman, supra note 6, at 307-310. Bank depositors face a form of
prisoners' dilemma when individual depositors can withdraw their money at any time, because banks
at any particular time maintain a store of funds on hand that is insufficient to meet the demands of all
their depositors.
[RIational depositors realize that any mass withdrawals of funds may force the bank to take
value-reducing actions such as liquidating commercial loans at distress prices or calling loans
prematurely. Thus, it is in the interest of depositors as a group not to withdraw large amounts
simultaneously. But if some class of depositors does decide, for whatever reason, to withdraw
assets from the bank, other depositors will rationally conclude that they must do the same to
avoid being left with nothing. The result of such a "run" on the bank's assets may be the
failure of a previously solvent bank to the detriment of depositors as a group.
Id. at 307-08.
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must share the benefits with all depositors. Because monitoring is costly
and because depositors are numerous and widely dispersed, in some cases
only depositors with very large deposits will be able to capture a sufficient
fraction of the gains from monitoring to make monitoring worthwhile. In
a world of depositor discipline, however, shareholders will bear the cost of
excessive risk-taking by a bank because depositors will demand compensa-
tion for excessive risk-taking in the form of higher interest payments.
These higher interest payments increase the capital costs of the bank and
are borne directly by the shareholders.69 In other words, to the extent that
free-rider problems impede the ability of depositors to monitor at an ideal
level, the shareholders will suffer.
Thus, bank managers and shareholders would share the desire of de-
positors to solve the collective action problem. To help depositors mitigate
their collective action problem, bankers would be willing to appoint inde-
pendent, outside agents to represent the depositors' interests if doing so
would reduce the risk premium they were required to pay on deposits by
an amount sufficient to offset the fees charged by the outsider. Such agents
would be the functional equivalent of the indenture trustees who perform
monitoring functions on behalf of corporate and municipal bondholders,
thereby mitigating the collective action problem facing these fixed claim-
ants. Such a system would provide depositors with a mechanism to con-
tinue to monitor their deposits (by proxy) after their initial invistigation of
the bank in the course of deciding where to place their funds.
In a world of depositor discipline, an additional force would keep banks
from engaging in excessive risk-taking after depositors have entrusted
their funds to the institution. This force stems from the fact that banks are
continually in the market for deposits. As Frank Easterbrook recently
pointed out in an important article in the American Economic Review,7"
investors such as uninsured depositors find it relatively easy to monitor
their investments ex ante. 1 But after they invest their funds, collective
action problems make such monitoring less likely. Easterbrook's insight is
that investors can solve this problem by placing their money at a firm that
must continually return to the market to obtain funding. The necessity of
continually returning to the market for new depositors will ensure existing
depositors of continual monitoring by the new depositors and further miti-
gate the collective action problem. 72 Banks are continually in the market
for new depositors because holders of demand deposits are continually
69. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 18, at 334-37, 342-43.
70. Easterbrook, Two Agency Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AMER. ECON. REV. 650, 653
(1984).
71. Id. at 654.
72. Id. at 654-55.
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withdrawing their funds. This situation should alleviate the collective ac-
tion problem facing depositors in a world in which all depositors do not
have the luxury of relying on de jure or de facto deposit insurance.
III. Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Empirical
Evidence
As we noted at the outset, the efficacy of depositor discipline can best be
ascertained through empirical data, and this empirical evidence decisively
supports the position that depositor discipline could control bank risk-
taking, and that even given bank bailouts and policies that suppress incen-
tives for depositor discipline, uninsured depositors do impose some disci-
pline on banks in a form other than uncontrolled bank runs at the first
sign of financial irregularity.73
A recent study by two economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chi-
cago, Herbert Baer and Elijah Brewer, looked at the risk premiums de-
manded by owners of large, uninsured certificates of deposit (CDs) to see
if riskier banks paid more to issue such certificates.74 Baer and Brewer
used two measures for bank risk: (1) the ratio of market value of equity to
total assets; and (2) the variance of returns on bank equity. The higher
the market value of a bank's equity in relation to the total value of its
assets, the greater the cushion uninsured depositors enjoy in the event of
financial trouble. Thus a bank with a low ratio of market value of equity
to total assets is riskier, from the perspective of uninsured depositors, than
a bank with a high market-to-asset ratio. The second measure of bank
risk, the variance of stock returns, is a well-known proxy for risk. Banks
whose stock values display a high measure of variance are perceived by
the market to be riskier.
Baer and Brewer found that the rates of return to holders of uninsured
CDs were closely correlated with changes in banks' market-to-asset ratios
and the volatility of bank stock returns. They found, for example, that as
banks' market-to-asset ratio decreased by one standard deviation, they
could be expected to pay rates on uninsured CDs that were seventeen
73. If market discipline by depositors did not work or inevitably took the form of depositor panic
and massive withdrawals, then we would expect to observe numerous bank runs and failures prior to
the creation of the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board. This was not the case. Professor George
Kaufman found that significant market discipline resulted in few bank failures during the period from
1875 to 1919, prior to the existence of the Fed or the FDIC. Simmons, Annual Conference Assesses
Bank Risk, EC:ON. PERSPICTIVES, FEt). RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, Sept./Oct. 1986, at 19 (report-
ing on Kaufman's study). In addition to depositor discipline, the high levels of bank capitalization
during this period also was suggested as a reason for the low incidence of bank failure. Capitalization
decisions are not made in a vacuum, however; depositor discipline leads to efficient levels of capitaliza-
tion because depositors demand a capital cushion as an assurance that their deposits will be safe.
74. Baer & Brewer, Uninsured Deposits as a Source of Market Discipline: Some New Evidence,
EC:oN. PERSPECTIVES, FEn. RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, Sept./Oct. 1986, at 23.
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basis points higher.75 An increase by one standard deviation in the volatil-
ity of stock returns was linked to an increase of sixteen basis points in the
rates of these certificates. 6 These results indicate that the market for CDs
reacts to the risk-related decisions of bank and that uninsured depositors
can exert discipline on banks through a market mechanism "even when
banks are solvent," and not only through bank runs.77
Several empirical studies cited by Garten also indicate that depositors
will not necessarily discipline banks solely through runs and that disci-
pline will not spill over to affect healthy banks.78 Two studies of the mar-
ket reaction to the disclosure of the problem bank list in 1976 observed a
lack of long-term changes in the banks' stock prices and concluded that
the market was aware of the financial situation of the banks before the
lists were made public. 9 Moreover, the information did not cause any
spillover of negative reactions to bank stocks generally.80 These studies
focus on the response of bank shareholders to the risk profiles of financial
institutions; however, uninsured depositors with an incentive to monitor
bank risk should react similarly, particularly because they will rely on the
same sources of information.8"
A more exhaustive study by Timothy Hannan and Gerald Hanweck
confirmed the findings that holders of uninsured CD's demand differential
risk premiums from banks.82 Hannan and Hanweck studied interest rate
data for five different CD maturities at 300 different banks.8" After a
series of calculations that used firm-specific data to indicate the perceived
probability of insolvency and that isolated variables such as bank size and
geographic location, they discovered that the market assesses both the vari-
ability of bank returns on assets and the bank capital-to-asset ratio and
exacts a price for bank risk-taking.84
Two further results of the Hannan and Hanweck study are noteworthy
75. Id. at 29.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 23.
78. Garten, supra note 3, at 144-45.
79. Johnson & Weber, The Impact of the Problem Bank Disclosure on Bank Share Prices, 8 J.
BANK RFS., Autumn 1977, at 179-80; Murphy, Disclosure of the Problem Bank Lists: A Test of the
Impact, 10 J. BANK RFis., Summer 1979, at 92, 95.
80. Murphy, supra note 79, at 92.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
82. T. HANNAN & G. HANWECK, BANK INSOLVENCY RISK AND THE MARKET FOR LARGE
CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT (Financial Structure Section, Division of Research and Statistics, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Working Paper in Banking, Finance, and
Microeconomics No. 86-1, April 1986).
83. Id. at 10.
84. Id. at 13-14, Table 3. The authors reported surprising findings with regard to bank profit-
ability; they found a positive relationship between that variable and the interest rates on uninsured
CDs. Id. at 14. This result indicates that bank profitability is not solely a measure of risk but also
reflects the presence of profitable uses of the funds because of a more efficient banking operation.
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for the purposes of assessing the viability of market discipline by deposi-
tors. First, the results were consistent with the proposition that uninsured
depositors perceive larger banks as safer than smaller banks, given the
FDIC's settlement policies that insulate all depositors in large banks from
any risk of loss.8" Second, the risk premium demanded by uninsured de-
positors increases as the maturity of the CD increases, indicating that
longer-term depositors are more concerned with the risk of bank insol-
vency than are shorter-term depositors.86
Eugenie Short, senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas,
found in a recent study that banks reporting four or more quarters of
negative income between 1982 and 1984 had a higher cost of funds than
other banks.87 Apparently, depositors demanded higher risk premiums
from the problem banks; however, the difference in the cost of funds was
not statistically significant when large banks were isolated.88 Short found
that the risk premiums demanded by depositors of CDs did not emerge
until after the identification of serious problems that could have
threatened the viability of the institution.88 Nonetheless, the findings do
prove empirically that market discipline operates even in the current sys-
tem that discourages it.
Other studies have produced similar results. Elijah Brewer and Cheng
Few Lee found that differences in banks' reliance on purchased funds
(primarily large CDs sold through a brokered market) significantly affect
the riskiness of bank activities.9" Banks that rely heavily on purchased
funds tend to be more risky,91 because purchased funds, unlike deposits,
are likely to be uninsured. This finding is particularly significant in that it
not only confirms that uninsured deposits are sensitive to bank risk, it also
indicates that the market imposes costs on shareholders who cause their
banks to engage in risky activities when those banks have a significant
portfolio of uninsured liabilities.
85. Id. at 12-13.
86. Id. at 18.
87. Short, Bank Problems and Financial Safety Nets, ECON. REV. OF THE FED. RESERVE BANK
OF DALLAS, March 1987, at 17; see also T. HANNAN & G. HANWECK, supra note 82; Baer &
Brewer, supra note 74 (cited by Short).
88. Id. at 25-26. Regulatory policies that absolutely protect uninsured depositors in large problem
banks through purchase and assumption transactions or open-bank assistance, while occasionally sub-
jecting uninsured depositors in small problem banks to risk of loss and delay through a deposit payolt,
explain the insensitivity of uninsured depositors in large banks to riskiness, as compared to smaller
banks.
89. Id. at 25. Short speculated that the market would react more quickly without the increasingly
absolute protection of deposit insurance. Id. at 18.
90. Brewer & Lee, How the Market Judges Bank Risk, 10 EcoN. PERSPE:t,:tIvEs, FEis. RE.s:RVE-
BANK OF CHICAGO, Nov/Dec. 1986 at 25.
91. Id.
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A study by John Harris, James Scott, and Joseph Sinkey 92 provides
empirical support for the proposition that bank bailouts protecting unin-
sured depositors amount to a subsidy to risky banks. They found that the
FDIC bailout of Continental Illinois Bank discouraged market discipline
by uninsured depositors in the nation's largest banks. This effect was ob-
served because the bailout conveyed the message that regulators would not
permit these banks to fail.9" The defacto insurance of all deposits in large
banks caused a cumulative abnormal return (i.e., total return net of ex-
pected market reaction) of forty per cent to the stockholders of the nation's
largest banks.
94
Joseph Sinkey studied the financial condition of First Pennsylvania
Bank, which received open-bank assistance from the FDIC in April
1980."5 He found that early warning signals of trouble could be discerned
six years before federal aid. Sinkey analyzed the bank through a return-
on-equity model and demonstrated that the quality of the loan portfolio
began to deteriorate in 1974;" that First Pennsylvania relied significantly
on purchased funds beginning in 1975; 7 and that the bank had been un-
successful in controlling expenses and developing consistently good man-
agement for some time before the bailout." The existence of these warn-
ing signals at such an early stage suggests that a more risk-sensitive
market might have averted the need for a bailout.
All of these studies present evidence indicating that shareholders will
cause the banks they control to engage in lower levels of risk-taking where
regulators decline to provide either de jure or de facto insurance for large
depositors. In the absence of insurance, shareholders must pay for the
privilege of engaging in excessive risk-taking, whereas the existence of de-
posit insurance allows them to engage in such risk-taking free of charge.
IV. Proposals to Maximize Market Discipline by Depositors
The foregoing theoretical discussion and empirical findings show the
need for change in the federal deposit insurance system. Because unin-
sured depositors can exercise discipline on banks that engage in excessive
92. Harris, Scott & Sinkey, The Wealth Effects of Regulatory Intervention Surrounding the
Bailout of Continental Illinois (1986) (unpublished paper on file at the Yale Journal on Regulation).
See Simmons, supra note 73, at 21 (reporting results of study).
93. Harris, Scott & Sinkey, supra note 92, at 6. After the Continental Illinois assistance, the
Comptroller of the Currency explicitly stated that the nation's eleven largest banks were considered by
federal regulators as too big to be allowed to fail. Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 1984, at 2, col. 2.
94. Harris, Scott & Sinkey, supra note 92, at 13.
95. Sinkey, The Performance of First Pennsylvania Bank Prior to its Bail Out, 14 J. BANK RES.
119 (1983).
96. Id. at 126-27.
97. Id. at 128.
98. Id. at 130.
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risk-taking, the system should be modified to use this potential market
force to supplement the relatively less efficient mechanism of regulatory
oversight. In this section we will outline possible regulatory changes sug-
gested by our analysis, and we will discuss additional market mechanisms
that uninsured depositors will develop so they can monitor bank risk
effectively.
The crucial problem with the federal deposit insurance system lies in its
choice of bank settlement techniques and in its refusal to deal with bank
failures in a consistent way. The FDIC has developed, but no longer uses,
a modification of the purchase and assumption transaction, known as the
modified payout procedure. This technique was adopted in 1983 as a
means "to give the FDIC more flexibility in minimizing disruption of
banking services, while exposing uninsured depositors to the risk of loss
on their deposits." '99 Under a modified payout, FDIC administrators make
an appraisal of a failed bank's assets and conservatively estimate the ulti-
mate recovery on those assets. Another solvent insured bank then assumes
all the insured deposits and the percentage of uninsured deposits
equivalent to the estimated total present value of bank assets recoverable
through liquidation. Uninsured depositors obtain receivership certificates
for the amount not assumed by the purchasing institution, and if the
FDIC realizes a higher net asset value than estimated, additional funds
are distributed on a pro rata basis to certificate holders.'00
The modified payout strengthens depositors' incentives to monitor bank
crisis and should be used in all bank failure situations, thereby eliminat-
ing the uncertainty currently associated with bank failures. 01 As Profes-
sor Garten correctly indicates, uncertainty is disastrous in the commercial
bank setting-in part because of the adverse impact on the extent of de-
positor monitoring. Uncertainty also increases the cost of funds for banks
because they must compensate depositors for the risk that in the event of a
failure, the FDIC will use a deposit payoff rather than the other tech-
niques that provide depositors absolute protection. This problem is partic-
ularly acute for medium-sized banks that are not certain candidates for a
purchase and assumption or open-bank assistance.
The contractual devices used by private insurers to mitigate the "moral
hazard" problem suggest another appropriate modification of the regula-
99. Gilbert, supra note 10, at 22; see also FF.DRAI. DFI'osIT INS. CORP. DiPoSIT INSURANCE
IN A CHANG;ING. ENVIRONMENT 111-4 to 111-6 (Apr. 1983).
100. For a discussion of the modified payout technique and its advantages in terms of maximizing
market discipline, see Note, The Modified Payout of Failed Banks: A Settlement Practice to Inject
Market Discipline into the Commercial Banking System, 73 VA. L. Rvv. 1349 (1987) (authored by
Elizabeth Garrett).
101. See Garten, supra note 3, at 163-66.
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tory system." 2 One mechanism in particular, risk-related deposit insur-
ance premiums, could be used by the FDIC to force banks to internalize
at least some of the costs of risk-taking. Currently, the FDIC assesses
banks an annual premium of one-twelfth of one percent of total domestic
deposits for federal deposit insurance coverage." 3 Because a flat-rate pre-
mium ignores the specific risk profile of a bank, a bank is able to engage
in risk-taking without affecting its cost of insurance.'0 4 Commentators
have devised various systems for calculating and implementing risk-related
premiums; 10 5 many of these would improve the present system by forcing
banks to offer interest rates to depositors that reflect bank risk and by
allowing depositors to more accurately measure the risk exposure of finan-
cial institutions.
As the regulatory system begins to encourage depositors to act as a
source of market discipline, depositors could develop ex ante contractual
mechanisms to facilitate monitoring and to limit risk.' Under a regime
that would rely more heavily on depositor discipline, equity investors,
managers, and uninsured depositors would develop contractual provisions
similar to bond indentures and debt covenants that limit the ability of
corporations to engage in conduct detrimental to creditors.' These effi-
cient contractual solutions often include restrictions on the dispositions of
assets, restrictions on mergers, and reporting requirements."' Depositors
placed at risk of loss would demand these and other contractual protec-
tions, and banks would develop them to decrease their cost of funds.
These suggestions for regulatory and contractual innovations are by no
means comprehensive. As the potential for market discipline by depositors
is gradually realized and as certainty is increased in the context of bank
failure policy, further market solutions may evolve as depositors seek to
economize on monitoring costs and as shareholders and managers attempt
to decrease the cost of capital.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
103. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (1982).
104. See Scott, Deposit Insurance: The Appropriate Roles for State and Federal Governments,
53 BROOKn.YN L. REV. 27, 33-34 (1987); see also id. at 35-36 (discussing more radical proposal: co-
insurance).
105. See, e.g., Kane, Proposals to Reduce FDIC and FSLIC Subsidies to Deposit Institution
Risk-Taking, IssUEs IN BANK RIG., Winter 1985, at 24, 31-32; Scott, supra note 72, at 38-42.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61 and 66-68.
107. Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. Rv. 89, 105
(1985).
108. For a detailed discussion of debt covenants, see Smith & Warner, supra note 41, at 125-43.
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Conclusion
The scores of bank failures may serve a beneficial purpose if they cause
us to identify the underlying weaknesses of the current regulatory sys-
tem-a system that negates any incentive for depositors to monitor bank
financial condition and to discipline institutions that engage in excessive
risk-taking. If these weaknesses are isolated and regulatory policy is
changed appropriately, perhaps by the adoption of modified payouts and
risk-related premiums, market mechanisms should develop to allow depos-
itors to discipline excessively risky banks.
Economic theory suggests that depositors exposed to risk of loss will
discipline excessively risky banks ex ante through contractual devices and
higher risk premiums and ex post through withdrawals. These actions
will be informed and targeted at appropriate firms because market forces,
in addition to statutes, will lead to the development of accurate, firm-
specific information. The empirical studies support this scenario by dem-
onstrating that depositors currently exert discipline that could be strength-
ened in a system designed to maximize it. Empirical studies indicate that
information about poor bank performance is available to depositors and
other creditors well before a failure so that gradual discipline can be ap-
plied. Thus an increase in depositor discipline promises to restrain exces-
sive risk-taking without further destabilizing the troubled banking
industry.

